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ABUSING THE PATIENT: 
MEDICARE FRAUD AND ABUSE 
AND HOSPITAL-PHYSICIAN 
INCENTIVE PLANS 
The Medicare1 prospective payment system (PPS),2 enacted 
in 1983, fundamentally restructured the method of government 
reimbursement to hospitals for care of Medicare inpatients. 3 The 
PPS uses diagnosis related groups (DRGs)• to fix amounts for 
reimbursing hospitals for treatment provided under the Medi-
care system. Upon admitting a Medicare patient, a hospital as-
signs her to a particular DRG. The DRG assigned entitles the 
hospital to receive a predetermined amount for that inpatient's 
care. Thus, the payment does not vary according to the severity 
of the patient's illness, the length of the patient's stay, or the 
unique characteristics of the particular patient's case. 5 If a hos-
pital can treat and discharge a patient at a cost less than the set 
rate of reimbursement, the hospital will make a profit on that 
1. The Medicare provisions of the Social Security Act provide medical benefits for 
qualified persons. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395zz (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
2. The PPS went into effect October 1, 1983. The Department of Health and Human 
Services administers the program. 42 C.F.R pt. 412 (1986). 
3. See infra notes 10-23 and accompanying text. 
4. DRGs originally categorized a patient into one of 467 groups, based upon such 
factors as patient age, principal diagnosis, complicating conditions, and type of surgery 
required. STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELATING 
TO MEDICARE HOSPITAL PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT PROPOSAL REPORTED TO CONGRESS BY SEC· 
RETARY RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER 3 (1983) [hereinafter SENATE FINANCE CoMM. PPS RE-
PORT], reprinted in 1 Hospital Prospective Payment System: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 6 (1983) 
[hereinafter 1 PPS Hearing]; 42 C.F.R. § 412.60(c)(l) (1986). For the most recent list of 
473 DRGs, see Medicare Program; Changes to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Pay-
ment System and Fiscal Year 1987 Rates, 51 Fed. Reg. 31,454, 31,561-74 (1986). 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(i)-(ii) (Supp. III 1985) allows for additional reim-
bursement where the length of a patient's stay exceeds the calculated mean length-of-
stay for all patients with a particular diagnosis by a specified number of days or by a 
fixed number of standard deviations, whichever is fewer. Also, if charges exceed the DRG 
reimbursement by a fixed dollar amount or by a fixed multiple of the PPS rate to be 
determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, whichever is greater, addi-
tional reimbursement is possible. 42 C.F.R. § 412.80(a) (1986). 
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patient. If not, the hospital breaks even or must absorb any 
costs above the reimbursement rate. 6 
Hospitals have developed several strategies for maintaining 
their financial position under the PPS. These include educating 
physicians on the costs of patient care7 and engaging in joint 
ventures.8 This Note focuses on a third strategy, hospital-physi-
cian incentive plans. 
Incentive plans encourage physicians to minimize hospital 
utilization of ancillary services and decrease length-of-stay for 
Medicare inpatients. By giving the participating physician finan-
cial rewards for reducing patient care costs, the plans offer the 
physician a significant stake in the cost-containment process. 
This Note examines the desirability of using incentive plans 
under the PPS. The Note argues that incentive plans are inap-
propriate cost-containment measures because they violate the 
Medicare fraud and abuse provisions9 and encourage abusive 
practices that clearly outweigh any financial benefits that result 
from their use. 
Part I provides a background discussion of the PPS, DRGs, 
and incentive plans. Part II focuses on the fraud and abuse pro-
visions of the Medicare statute and argues that incentive plans 
violate the plain language · of the statute, which prohibits any 
knowing and willful remuneration for the inducement of refer-
rals. Part III concentrates on the fraudulent and abusive prac-
tices that incentive plans encourage. The plans frustrate legisla-
tive intent because they encourage practices that subvert the 
cost-containment purposes of the PPS and have an adverse ef-
fect on patient care. 
I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM AND 
CosT CoNSCIOUSNEss 
Prior to 1983, Medicare reimbursed hospitals for inpatient 
care according to the actual reasonable cost of services ren-
6. 42 C.F.R. § 412.l(a) (1986); see infra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. 
7. For descriptions of various programs of physician education, see Berger, Physician 
Involvement in Hospital Cost Control: Leaders in the Field Talk About Their Pro-
grams, HosP. F., Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 17. 
8. See Carpenter, Finding the Shoe that Fits: Opportunities in the Marketplace of 
PPOs, HMOs, and DRGs, HosP. F., Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 14; Ellwood, When MDs Meet 
DRGs: Physicians Searching for a Response to Prospective Pricing May Find Hospitals 
Their Best Allies, HOSPITALS, Dec. 16, 1983, at 62, 62-64, 66; Richards, Nothing Ven-
tured, Nothing Gained, HOSP. MED. STAFF, Jan. 1985, at 5. 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see infra note 47. 
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dered. 1° Congressional amendments to the Medicare statute in 
1983,11 however, providing for prospective reimbursement, dras-
tically altered the method of reimbursing hospitals for care of 
these Medicare patients. 12 
A. Prospective Payment 
The purpose of the PPS was to contain burgeoning health 
care costs. 13 As the number of elderly patients qualifying for 
Medicare increased in recent years, u and as medical costs 
skyrocketed,111 the Medicare system faced serious financial diffi-
culties and even possible insolvency.16 In 1983, Congress enacted 
the PPS as one possible solution. An integral part of that system 
was the DRG. 
10. Id. § 1395ww (1982) (amended 1983). 
11. Social Security Amendments Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, tit. VI, 97 Stat. 65, 
149-72 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (Supp. Ill 1985)). 
12. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. 
13. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR EVALUATING THE 
IMPACTS OF MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT OF POST-HOSPITAL LONG-TERM-CARE SER-
VICES: PRELIMINARY REPORT 1 (1985), reprinted in Sustaining Quality Health Care 
Under Cost Containment: Joint Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Aging and 
the Task Force on the Rural Elderly of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 99th Cong., 
1st Sess. app. at 102, 102 (1985) [hereinafter Joint Hearing on Quality Health Care]; see 
also Matsui, Medicare Payment Policy Needs Corrections, 254 J. A.M.A. 2454 (1985) 
(member of Congress explaining his reasons for supporting a pause in the transition to 
national DRG rates). 
14. See 0. Hatch, Health Care Costs: A Discussion Paper, reprinted in Health Care 
Cost: Defining the Issues, 1983: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and 
Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 9-10 (1983) [hereinafter Health Care Cost 
Hearings); see also A. SORKIN, HEALTH CARE AND THE CHANGING ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
56 (1986). 
15. Expenditures for health care currently represent over one-tenth of the gross na-
tional product, more than double the comparable fraction in 1950. A. SORKIN, supra note 
14, at 5, 6, Table 2-1. Federal expenditures through the Medicare and Medicaid pro-
grams increased an average of 17% per year between 1968 and 1983. Id. at 72; see H.R. 
REP. No. 404, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 1-2 (1979); see also SENATE FINANCE COMM. 
PPS REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 ("In FY 1967, medicare paid $3.2 billion for hospital 
services; in FY 1983, medicare will pay over $37 billion. Medicare expenditures for hospi-
tal care have increased 19 percent per year during the last 3 years."), reprinted in 1 PPS 
Hearing, supra note 4, at 5. Richard Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices, projected that Medicare expenditures under cost-based reimbursement for hospital 
services would reach $44.7 billion in 1984 and $58.4 billion in 1985. 1 PPS Hearing, 
supra note 4, at 17, 20. Within the health care sector, hospital costs increase most rap-
idly, primarily due to the costs of inputs, which include food, labor, and supplies, the 
basic hotel services a hospital provides. A. SORKIN, supra note 14, at 73. 
16. Health Care Cost Hearings, supra note 14, at 33 (statement of Margaret Heckler, 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, that the Medicare Hospital Insurance Trust 
Fund will be insolvent in 1990 despite the PPS); A. SORKIN, supra note 14, at 53-56 & 
Tables 4-3, 4-4. 
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B. Diagnosis Related Groups 
Department of Health and Human Services regulations imple-
mented DRGs, a key element in the new system.17 Instead of 
reimbursement on a cost basis, DRGs reflect the average cost of 
care for patients with a particular diagnosis.18 The Health Care 
Financing Administration (HCF A) calculates DRGs on the basis 
of the average cost of care per diagnosis.18 The assigned DRG 
establishes a fixed price for the total treatment rendered by an 
acute care facility20 to a Medicare inpatient. HCFA expects most 
hospitals, with some effort expended towards cost containment, 
to break even on the aggregate costs of caring for their Medicare 
inpatients. 21 
Under the PPS, a hospital earns a profit only if it discharges 
the patient at a cost lower than the DRG rate of reimbursement 
for that particular patient's illness. Thus, DRGs encourage acute 
care facilities to decrease spending for care of all Medicare pa-
tients to balance the expense of the uncompensated longer stays. 
If a Medicare patient stays in the hospital longer and incurs 
more charges than allowed by the assigned DRG, the hospital 
will suffer a loss. 22 Thus, the PPS allows a hospital to break 
even, make a profit, or suffer a loss on care provided to any par-
ticular Medicare patient. 
17. 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.60-.63 (1986). DRGs are modeled upon a system first developed 
at Yale University. R. BUCHANAN & J. MINOR, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE REIM-
BURSEMENT 31 (1985). 
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(2)-(4) (Supp. III 1985). The actual dollar value assigned to 
any particular DRG will vary from one hospital to another as the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) takes into account such variables as geographic location and 
area wage levels. 42 C.F.R. § 412.63(g)-(h) (1986). 
19. Congress recognized that under the PPS, some patients would be treated at a cost 
less than the DRG rate and some would not. The basic idea was to give hospital manage-
ment an incentive to control costs. 1 PPS Hearing, supra note 4, at 18 (statement of 
Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Servs.). 
20. The PPS exempts certain hospitals-psychiatric hospitals, rehabilitation hospi-
tals, children's hospitals, and hospitals in which the average length-of-stay is greater 
than 25 days-from its coverage. In addition, DRGs do not cover distinct portions of a 
hospital constituting psychiatric or rehabilitation units. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(l)(B) 
(Supp. III 1985). As a result, Medicare reimburses these hospitals, or portions of hospi-
tals, on a reasonable cost basis. 42 C.F.R. § 412.22(b) (1986). 
21. See Medicare Program; Prospective Payments for Medicare Inpatient Hospital 
Services, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,752, 39,805 (1983). 
22. For instance, the average national DRG payment rate for a hip replacement with-
out complications in 1983 was $4500. 1 PPS Hearing, supra note 4, at 49 (statement of 
Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Servs.). A hospital, reimbursed at 
this rate, would receive $4500 for treating a hip replacement patient, regardless of actual 
cost. 
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DRG reimbursement encourages hospitals to develop in-house 
cost-containment measures. If higher-cost hospitals do not make 
a profit or at least break even on patients insured through Medi-
care, they face serious financial difficulties or insolvency. 23 The 
amount of services provided to patients is key to controlling 
costs. 
C. Hospital-Physician Incentive Plans 
Hospitals provide the equipment and manpower necessary for 
physicians to care for patients, but the physician orders the vari-
ety of services provided each patient. 2• Because doctors control 
the type and quantity of care administered, they determine 
whether a hospital will make or lose money under the PPS on 
any given Medicare patient. 211 Physicians' decisions regarding 
patient discharges and use of ancillary services, such as labora-
tory work, x-rays, and other diagnostic testing, affect the hospi-
tal's ability to break even or earn a profit under the PPS. Thus, 
hospitals' efforts at cost containment depend on the cost-effec-
tive behavior of their physicians. 26 The PPS does not encompass 
23. By one commentator's estimation, a majority of the country's hospitals achieved 
record profits in the first quarter of 1985. Eighteen percent of all hospitals are, however, 
suffering losses. Lefton, Hospitals Score Record Profits Under DRGs, Am. Med. News, 
Aug. 9, 1985, at 1, col. 1. Donald Wegmiller, chairman-elect of the American Hospital 
Association (AHA), predicted that one-half of that 18~, •• or over 500 of 5800 hospitals in 
the country, will close in the next few years. Id. But see Frederick, How You'll Feel the 
Money Squeeze on Hospitals, MED. EcoN., Feb. 4, 1985, at 117 (denying the claim that 
substantial numbers of hospitals are facing bankruptcy under the DRGs); Tichon, Krie-
ger, Chinn, Volk & Robinow, Medicare: Do DRG's Diminish the Quality of Care?, 8 
WHITTIER L. REV. 427, 430 (1986) [hereinafter Do DRGs Diminish the Quality of Care?] 
(transcript of panel discussion presented at the Fifth Annual Whittier Health Law Sym-
posium, Whittier College School of Law, Mar. 14, 1986) (asserting that hospitals are 
making more money under the PPS than they did under cost-based reimbursement). 
24. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 404, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 69 (1979) (dissenting 
views on the favorable reporting out of the Hospital Cost Containment Act of 1979); 
Mushlin, Measuring Cost and Quality of Care Under Prospective Reimbursement, 
HosP. MED. STAFF, June 1984, at 17. 
25. For example, if a physician treating a patient for a hip replacement, see supra 
note 22, treated the patient at a cost to the hospital of less than $4500, the hospital 
would make a profit. On the other hand, if the cost of the various procedures together 
with the cost of room and board exceeded $4500, the hospital would have to absorb the 
loss. Cf. Mariner, Diagnosis Related Groups: Evading Social llesponsibility?, 12 LAW 
MED. & HEALTH CARE 243 (1984) (suggesting that physicians are inappropriate deci-
sionmakers for health care rationing). 
26. "[E]fficient hospital operation requires close cooperation between hospital admin-
istrators and physician staff .... [l]t is the physician who makes most of the decisions on 
patient care. A hospital will not be able to live within Medicare's prospective payment 
unless its physicians are willing to economize." R. Rubin, in DRG's-What's Next? Two 
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physician reimbursement.27 Instead, Medicare reimburses physi-
cians on the basis of reasonable, customary, and prevailing 
charges.28 Under this system, physicians receive what Medicare 
deems appropriate compensation for the services provided. 
To promote conservative use of facilities, some hospitals have 
devised plans that encourage physicians to practice in accor-
dance with the DRG rates.29 These incentive plans give physi-
cians a greater personal financial stake30 in the cost-containment 
process and provide an incentive for them to keep patient care 
costs down. Under one form of hospital-physician incentive plan, 
when a physician treats a patient at a cost below the DRG rate 
of reimbursement, the physician will receive a share of the hos-
pital's profits on that patient. 31 
Hollywood Community Hospital32 recently implemented such 
a plan. Under Hollywood Community's plan, the hospital, when 
Views 7 (text of seminar sponsored by the Mount Sinai School of Medicine, Department 
of Health Care Management (1984)) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.); see Ellwood, 
supra note 8; Jessee & Suver, Physicians and DRGs: Survival Under PPS, HosP. MED. 
STAFF, Apr. 1984, at 2-3; Richman, Physician Incentive Plan Study May Give Guidance, 
Moo. HEALTHCARE, July 19, 1985, at 48. 
27. Congress has considered a system similar to the PPS to govern physician reim-
bursement. Lundberg, How Should Physicians Be Paid?, 254 J. AM.A. 2638 (1985). 
28. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.501-.508, .551 (1986). See A. SORKIN, supra note 14, at 48-49, for 
a brief discussion of physician reimbursement under Medicare. 
29. An additional reason for the plans is that hospitals, now competing for physicians 
in order to increase revenues, are striving to attract the best doctors possible. See Rich-
ards, supra note 8, at 9. The financial attractiveness of incentive plans is one way to 
draw those physicians who can make the most money for the hospital. See A. SORKIN, 
supra note 14, at 83-84. 
30. Many physicians, such as surgeons, rely on hospitals for their practice and liveli-
hood. Ellwood, supra note 8, at 62-63. 
31. This type of incentive plan rewards each physician on an individual basis. Each 
physician's additional compensation for cost-effective behavior is determined per pa-
tient. Other hospitals could implement plans on other bases. For example, hospitals 
could reward physicians according to the hospital's profits on all of the particular physi-
cian's patients. The form of incentive could also vary. The hospital may choose to reward 
her with better equipment, see Chenen, Prospective Payment Can Put You in Court, 
MED. EcoN., July 1984, at 134, 141, or decreased rental rates on office space, see A. 
SORKIN, supra note 14, at 89. 
Still other plans may reward the individual physician on her own performance or a 
group of physicians for their overall cost-effective behavior. See Note, The Medicare Rx: 
Prospective Pricing to Effect Cost Containment, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 743 (1986) (advo-
cating an indirect, aggregate approach to physician incentives). Distinctions among in-
centives make little difference in the analysis of the fraud and abuse problem, see infra 
Part II, except perhaps in the degree to which abuse is encouraged, and this Note will 
not differentiate among them. 
32. Located in Hollywood, California, Hollywood Community Hospital is part of the 
Paracelsus Healthcare Corp. (Pasadena, California) chain. Richman, supra note 26, at 
48. As of July 1985, 12 of the Paracelsus group of 14 hospitals had implemented similar 
plans. Id. A "good number" of physicians participate in the Hollywood Community in-
centive plan. Id. 
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it discharges a Medicare patient, calculates the retail charges, 
including room, board, and other charges, it would have billed 
had the patient been privately insured or self-paying. If a Medi-
care DRG payment exceeds seventy-five percent of what the 
hospital would have charged a private patient, the attending 
physician, who has chosen to participate in the program, re-
ceives a percentage of the excess over that seventy-five percent.33 
The purpose of Hollywood Community's program was to en-
courage its physicians to be more cost-conscious while providing 
quality care.a. The hospital expected to achieve cost savings by 
encouraging physicians to decrease patient length-of-stay and to 
use fewer ancillary services. Hollywood Community anticipated 
that the "Savings Program" would not compromise the quality 
of care given in the institution.3 ~ Nevertheless, the Department 
of Health and Human Services Regional Inspector General36 is 
investigating the effects of the Savings Program on patient 
care.37 
Incentive plans represent one of the first efforts at profit shar-
ing38 in the health care industry. In the past, health care provid-
ers avoided profit-sharing arrangements primarily because phy-
sicians consider the practice unethical. 39 The American Medical 
33. The formula for Hollywood Community's incentive payments is as follows: 
If the Amount of the 
Medicare Payment Falls 
within the Range of 
the Following Percentages 
of Retail Charges 
75-85(';, 
85-95~,. 
Then the Hospital 
Would Pay the Physician the 
Following Percentage of the 
Amount within Each Such Range 
10% 
15% 
95:i, and greater 20% 




36. Richman, supra note 26, at 48. This investigation was initiated at the request of 
the American Medical Association (AMA) and is examining the effects of the plan, in-
cluding impacts on quality of care. Telephone interview with Donald Goldman, attorney 
for Hollywood Community Hospital (Feb. 10, 1986) [hereinafter Goldman interview]. For 
a discussion of the AMA's primary objections to the incentive plan, see infra text accom-
panying notes 93-98. 
37. Richman, supra note 26, at 53. The Hollywood Community Hospital expects "a 
clean bill of health" from the Regional Inspector General regarding the impact on qual-
ity of care. Goldman interview, supra note 36. 
38. The terminology used, be it "profit sharing," "risk sharing," or "kickback," see 
infra Part II, is of little consequence, so this Note uses the term with the least objection-
able connotation. 
39. "The AMA evidently sees [risk-sharing arrangements] as a form of fee splitting, 
in which the hospital makes some money from its physicians' behavior .... In fact, many 
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Association (AMA) has long regarded the practice of fee split-
ting as improper:40 "[P]hysicians are not entitled to derive a 
profit that results directly or indirectly from services delivered 
by other health care providers who are not their employees or 
agents. "41 
Another reason health care providers did not implement 
profit-sharing programs more quickly was lack of necessity and 
incentive in the former system of cost-based reimbursement.•2 
Under cost-based reimbursement, hospitals had little incentive 
to control the amount of care administered because the reim-
bursement received covered the full reasonable amount of care 
provided.43 The same was and remains true of physician reim-
bursement. Medicare reimburses physicians according to usual, 
reasonable, and customary fees. 0 Thus, the more care provided, 
the greater the physician's gross income. There is no incentive in 
the PPS itself to control physician costs because the PPS does 
not affect physician reimbursement.411 
Although incentive plans may encourage cost-effective behav-
ior in physicians, these plans and similar forms of profit sharing 
face a formidable obstacle: the language of the fraud and abuse 
provisions46 of the Medicare statute. 
states have incorporated statutory opposition to fee splitting into their medical practice 
acts." Friedman, The Lure of Risk-Sharing Arrangements, HosP. MED. STAFF, Jan. 1985, 
at 27 (interview with William F. Jessee, M.D.). 
40. Id. 
41. Judicial Council, AMA, 38th Interim Meeting, Report D-Ethical Implications of 
Hospital-Physician Risk-Sharing Arrangements Under DRGs (Dec. 2-5, 1984) [hereinaf-
ter Judicial Council, Report D] (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.), reprinted in 253 J. 
A.M.A. 2425 (1985). 
42. H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 15, at 26; see 1 PPS Hearing, supra note 4, at 16 
(statement of Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Servs.); Goldsmith, 
Entrepreneurship: Its Place in Health Care, HosP. F., Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 17 (suggesting 
that adaptation to the new competitive era in health care provision necessitates the 
adoption of entrepreneurial values); Lowenstein, Iezzoni & Moskowitz, Prospective Pay-
ment for Physician Services: Impact on Medical Consultation Practices, 254 J. A.M.A. 
2632, 2633 (1985) (describing possible effects of proposed physician DRGs on consulta-
tion practices). 
43. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
44. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
45. Jessee & Suver, supra note 26, at 3. 
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see infra note 47. 
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II. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE FRAUD AND ABUSE PROVISIONS 
The plain language of the fraud and abuse provisions47 is con-
sistent with the premise that hospitals and physicians, in offer-
ing and accepting, respectively, the financial rewards of hospital-
physician incentive plans, violate the Social Security Act. Under 
the plans, hospitals knowingly and willfully48 pay a monetary re-
muneration49 to physicians. Through such payments, the hospi-
tals induce physicians to refer certain Medicare patients to these 
hospitals and to order or arrange for goods and services for those 
patients in a particular fashion. 110 
Thus, hospital-physician incentive plans can violate the provi-
sions of the fraud and abuse statute dealing with illegal remu-
neration in several ways. First, physicians violate the provisions 
when they knowingly and willfully receive remuneration in re-
turn for referring patients to the offering hospital111 for the cost-
effective ordering of goods or services paid for by Medicare.112 
The hospital violates the provisions by offering or paying a re-
47. Id. The provisions governing the legality of incentive plans are as follows: 
(b) Illegal remunerations 
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration (in-
cluding any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, 
in cash or in kind-
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing 
or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment 
may be made in whole or in part under this subchapter, or 
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or rec-
ommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or 
item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under this 
subchapter, 
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more 
than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. 
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (includ-
ing any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in 
cash or in kind to any person to induce such person-
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging 
for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be 
made in whole or in part under this subchapter, or 
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing, 
leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which pay-
ment may be made in whole or in part under this subchapt.er, 
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more 
than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. 
Id. § 1395nn(h)(l)-(2) (1982). 
48. See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. 
49. See infra notes 55-68 and accompanying text. 
50. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text. 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(l)(A) (1982). 
52. Id. § 1395nn(b)(l)(B). 
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muneration to induce physicians to refer patients to the hospital 
for services paid for by Medicare.53 Finally, the hospital violates 
the statute by offering or paying a remuneration to induce phy-
sicians to order or arrange for goods or services paid for by 
Medicare.Ii• Thus, "remuneration," "referral," and "knowing and 
willful" are key terms in establishing fraud and abuse. 
A. Remuneration 
Congress added the term "any remuneration" in 1977 in order 
to clarify the former language.H Originally, the statute simply 
proscribed kickbacks, bribes, and rebates.li6 Courts encountered 
numerous cases exemplifying definitional problems with the 
original language.li7 The addition of the words "any remunera-
53. Id. § 1395nn(b)(2)(A). 
54. Id. § 1395nn(b)(2)(B). This Note will not discuss this aspect of the statutory vio-
lation in depth. The plans themselves are intended and designed specifically to have the 
prohibited effect. Physicians accept rewards in return for the encouraged behavior. The 
violations are obvious. See, e.g., the discussion of Hollywood Community Hospital's Sav-
ings Program, supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. 
55. Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142, sec. 
4, 91 Stat. 1175, 1179, 1180 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(l)-(2) 
(1982)); see SuBCOMM. ON HEALTH OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 95TH CONG., 
1ST SESS., H.R. 3: MEDICARE-MEDICAID ANTI-FRAUD AND ABUSE AMENDMENTS 8-10 (Comm. 
Print 1977). 
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b) (1976) (amended 1977). 
57. One such case is United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979). Porter 
involved a laboratory operator convicted, under the original language, of offering kick-
backs or bribes to physicians in exchange for referrals. The defendant had paid "han-
dling fees" of $35 to induce physicians to refer patients to his laboratory. These fees 
were allegedly paid for interpretation of results, for which Medicare paid less than six 
dollars per patient. Id. at 1051. The defendant appealed, claiming his actions did not 
come within the statutory terms "kickback" and "bribe." 
In reversing the conviction, the Fifth Circuit stated that, absent a statutory definition 
of relevant terms, they are assumed to be used as they are commonly and ordinarily 
understood. The court understood "bribe" to encompass "acts that are malum in se be-
cause they entail either a breach of trust or duty or the corrupt selling of what our 
society deems not to be legitimately for sale." Id. at 1053 (quoting United States v. 
Zacher, 586 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir. 1978)). The court defined "kickback" as a "secret 
return to an earlier possessor of part of a sum received." Id. at 1054 (emphasis in origi-
nal). Perhaps this narrow definition of kickback was what Congress attempted to correct 
when it clarified the statutory language. 
The majority of cases after Porter reject its narrow definitions. See, e.g., United States 
v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir.) ("We cannot agree that the term kickback is 
limited to a return of funds to an earlier possessor. The term is commonly used and 
understood to include 'a percentage payment ... for granting assistance by one in a 
position to open up or control a source of income.'") (quoting Webster's Dictionary), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979); see also United States v. Weingarden, 468 F. Supp. 
410, 412 (E.D. Mich. 1979), aff'd, 625 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 
(1980). 
In United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1978), the court reversed the convic-
tion of a nursing home operator convicted of receiving bribes from families of Medicaid 
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tion" in 1977, however, significantly broadened the scope of the 
fraud and abuse provisions. Because Congress did not define the 
term "remuneration," the word must be interpreted in light of 
its common and ordinary meaning. 118 
"Remuneration" is generally defined as a reward or compensa-
tion,69 or as a payment for services.60 Under this definition, in-
centive plans plainly come within the language of the Fraud and 
Abuse Amendments. Through such incentive plans, hospitals 
give physicians a bonus in addition to Medicare's payment for 
the physicians' services rendered. 61 
In the legislative history of the Fraud and Abuse Amendments 
of 1977, Congress announced no intent to deter new activities by 
the addition of "remuneration" but instead discussed the same 
types of abuses that led to the original enactment of the fraud 
and abuse statute.62 Although this may suggest that Congress 
did not intend to prohibit practices such as profit sharing, Con-
gress must have understood the significant ramifications of the 
patients. Id. at 913. Section 1909 of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396h (1982), contains 
a provision identical to the Medicare fraud and abuse statute. In deciding the case, the 
Second Circuit considered the proper meaning and connotation of "kickback" and 
"bribe." The court concluded that the terms kickback, rebate, and bribe connote "a cor-
rupt payment or receipt of payment in violation of the duty imposed by Congress on 
providers of services to use federal funds only for intended purposes and only in the 
approved manner." 586 F.2d at 916. For a discussion of these and other cases decided 
before the addition to the statute of the words "any remuneration," see Comment, Phy-
sician Fraud in the Medicare-Medicaid Programs-Kickbacks, Bribes, and Remunera-
tions, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 684 (1980). 
58. See Porter, 591 F.2d at 1053. The "Plain Meaning Rule" of statutory construc-
tion requires that courts first examine the language of a statute. If the meaning of the 
statute is plain, "the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." 
2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01, at 73 (Sands 
4th ed. 1984) (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917)). 
59. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1165 (5th ed. 1979). 
60. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 971 (1979). 
61. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. 
62. Among the most prevalent types of fraud Congress sought to discourage was the 
"Medicaid mill." The Medicaid mill is typically an inner-city facility deriving most of its 
business from Medicare and Medicaid patients. The most common types of mill viola-
tions include medically unfounded referrals within the mill, billing for multiple services 
to family members who did not seek treatment, billing for services more extensive than 
those actually provided, directing a patient to a particular pharmacy, and billing for ser-
vices not rendered. H.R. REP. No. 393, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 45, reprinted in 
1977 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 3039, 3047-48. Also discussed in the legislative history 
were violations by clinical laboratories, independent practitioners, and nursing homes. 
Id. at 46-47, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 3048-50; see 1 Medicare 
and Medicaid Frauds: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Long-Term Care and the 
Subcomm. on Health of the Elderly of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. 40 (1975) [hereinafter 1 Medicare and Medicaid Frauds Hearing] (statement of 
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addition of the words "any remuneration."63 The use of such a 
broad term suggests that Congress intended to expand the cov-
erage of the statute, perhaps to cover more than the most bla-
tant forms of Medicare fraud and abuse. Congress did not dis-
tinguish between "good" remuneration and "bad" remun-
eration.H Rather, it declared "any remuneration" a violation of 
the statute.611 
The Third Circuit's recent interpretation of the fraud and 
abuse provisions in United States v. Greber66 supports this con-
Paul M. Allen, Chief Deputy Director, Michigan Dep't of Social Servs., regarding Medi-
caid fraud). 
The most costly, noncriminal abuse identified in the Medicare system was the furnish-
ing of excessive services. H.R. REP. No. 393, supra, at 47, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CooE 
CoNG. & Ao. NEWS at 3050. For further discussion, see generally 1 Medicare and Medi-
caid Frauds Hearing, supra; 2 Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Long-Term Care of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1975); H.R. REP. No. 393, supra, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CooE CoNG. & Ao. NEWS 3039. 
See also Tepper, Medicare and Medicaid Fraud, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 286, 288-89 
(1980). 
63. "It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that effect must be given, if 
possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute." 2A N. SINGER, supra note 58, § 
46.06, at 104 (quoting State v. Bartley, 39 Neb. 353, 58 N.W. 172 (1894)). 
64. See supra note 62. 
65. This assertion becomes less plausible, however, when one examines the implica-
tions of such a literal reading of the statute. For example, under a strict literal interpre-
tation, a hospital could be found in violation of the Amendments for simply receiving 
Medicare funds. The hospital would be knowingly and willfully soliciting remuneration 
directly and overtly in cash in return for ordering or arranging for a service for which 
payment may be made by Medicare. This result is surely absurd, but follows from a 
strict literal reading. A similar reading of that part of the statute that prohibits the 
offering or paying of remuneration to induce referrals, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(2) (1982), 
see supra note 47, would create doubt as to the legality of the government's reimburse-
ment of hospitals and physicians as this type of remuneration induces such parties to 
order or arrange for the ordering of services for Medicare patients. 
These examples seem to indicate that Congress, when using the words any remunera-
tion, did not mean to imply that, regardless of the form or intent, if money changes 
hands the transaction is illegal. Congress clearly intended, however, to include all but the 
absurd readings. Under § 1395nn(b)(3)(B), "any amount paid by an employer to an em-
ployee (who has a bona fide employment relationship with such employer) for employ-
ment in the provision of covered items or services" is excluded from the coverage of the 
provisions dealing with illegal remunerations. Congress' specific exclusion of employer-
employee relationships from the statute's coverage suggests that any other such payment 
relationship, including hospital-physician incentive plans, falls within its prohibitions on 
remuneration. For an interpretation of the word "remuneration" written prior to United 
States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 396 (1985), discussed 
infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text, see Comment, supra note 57, at 693-95. 
66. 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 396 (1985). The facts of Greber are 
typical of Medicare fraud cases involving referrals in that the defendant was one of the 
bad actors that the statute was enacted to cover. See, e.g., United States v. Duz-Mor 
Diagnostic Laboratory, 650 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 
999 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979); United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 
(5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Weingarden, 468 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Mich. 1979), a{f'd 
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clusion. To date, this is the only case to shed light on the mean-
ing of "any remuneration." Greber involved "kickbacks" to re-
ferring physicians of forty percent of the Medicare receipts on 
the referring physicians' patients. A jury convicted Greber, an 
osteopathic physician, of violating the Medicare fraud statute. 87 
On appeal, the Third Circuit defined "any remuneration" to in-
clude "not only sums for which no actual service was performed 
but also those amounts for which some professional time was ex-
pended."88 Here, the court broadly interpreted "any remunera-
tion" in its determination of whether payments are illegal. 
Under the Greber court's interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage, the transfer of Medicare funds from one physician to an-
other is illegal. Defendants cannot attempt to insulate them-
selves from criminal liability by claiming that the transfer of 
funds constituted payment for services rendered. In applying 
this line of reasoning to the relationship between a hospital and 
physician created by incentive plans, clearly the hospital pays 
the nonemployee physicians for professional services-the cost-
effective use of hospital resources in patient care. Nevertheless, 
this relationship does not shield the participants in an incentive 
plan from liability. 
B. Referrals 
The Medicare fraud statute also requires that the remunera-
tion be offered to induce a person to refer, and be received for 
referring, Medicare patients to a particular provider. Incentive 
plans satisfy this requirement by inducing physicians to refer 
Medicare patients to the hospital offering the incentive.89 Con-
sider the following hypothetical: Doctor A practices in a city of 
moderate size with several hospitals, two of which, Hospitals X 
and Y, have granted the doctor admitting and staff privileges.70 
Doctor A is a thoracic surgeon and has a booming practice in 
these days of high anxiety. Hospital X recently implemented an 
incentive plan in order to combat the adverse financial effects of 
sub nom. United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 
(1980). 
67. 760 F.2d at 69. 
68. Id. at 71. 
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(l)(A), (2)(A); see supra note 47. 
70. Staff physicians are in a slightly different position than are physicians who func-
tion as independent contractors with the hospital. Staff physicians will not have an op-
portunity to prefer a particular hospital because of their employment situation, but the 
other concerns, discussed infra, will apply to both types of physicians. 
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Medicare's DRG reimbursement system. Hospital Y considers 
such plans of questionable legality and decides against 
implementation. 
When Doctor A seeks to admit a patient to a hospital, she will 
decide whether to have the patient admitted to Hospital X or 
Hospital Y. Assuming that the two hospitals have identical ser-
vices and equipment, her decision may depend on the nature 
and severity of the patient's illness. If the patient's diagnosis 
corresponds to a generous DRG and the length-of-stay is not 
likely to be extreme, the incentive plan encourages the doctor to 
send the patient to Hospital X, which will probably turn a profit 
on the patient and distribute part of the proceeds to the doctor. 
If the patient's condition is less favorable and the DRG reim-
bursement low in relation to treatment cost, Doctor A will not 
care where the patient is sent because it will not affect her in-
come at either location.71 Because the incentive plans only be-
come effective if a doctor's discharges result in profits for the 
hospital,72 a patient who incurs costs in excess of the DRG reim-
bursement will not trigger the incentive plan. 73 
Such behavior by physicians may create a windfall for Hospi-
tal X, which provided an incentive for its physicians to admit 
their less seriously ill patients. At the same time, other hospitals 
in the area, like Hospital Y, will be burdened by a larger propor-
tion of more seriously ill patients with longer lengths-of-stay. 
These other hospitals might respond by setting up their own in-
centive plans. If all hospitals set up incentive plans, however, 
the variations among the plans utilized would still induce physi-
cians to refer patients to particular institutions. As each plan is 
likely to attract different physicians, the industrywide imple-
mentation of such plans will not discourage financially moti-
vated referrals. Moreover, the likelihood of all hospitals imple-
menting such plans is slight. Because many hospitals are facing 
bankruptcy,7" few will be able to implement a plan that will re-
71. This assumes the incentive plan does not provide sanctions for overutilization. 
One type of incentive plan, described by the AHA, would induce Doctor A to send her 
sicker patients to Hospital Y. Under this type of plan, the hospital pays a flat monthly 
fee to those physicians who on the whole have reduced their patients' length-of-stay by 
one day. Under this scheme, physicians would jeopardize their chances of receiving in-
centive payments if they admitted patients who might stay in the hospital in excess of a 
"normal" length-of-stay in relation to their diagnosis. Select Legal Advisory Comm. on 
Medicare, Office of Legal & Regulatory Affairs, AHA, Medicare-Medicaid Antifraud and 
Abuse Amendments: Application to Hospital Activities Under the Medicare Prospective 
Payment System 10 (Feb. 1985) (copy on file with U. M1cH. J.L. REF.). 
72. See supra notes 31 & 33 and accompanying text. 
73. Id. 
74. Cf. supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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duce the margin of profit, leaving the hospital with little to use 
in simply maintaining solvency. 
The potential effects of incentive plans on admissions directly 
conflict with the language of the Fraud and Abuse Amendments 
to the Medicare Act. The statute proscribes remuneration in-
tended to induce referrals. In the example considered above, if 
Doctor A sends her profitable patients to Hospital X because of 
the incentive plan, the hospital has induced that referral. 
The primary obstacle to finding a violation of this provision, 
then, is proof that the inducement is intentional.711 Thus, fact 
patterns and circumstances are likely to be determinative in 
evaluating any particular plan. Nevertheless, the fact that incen-
tive plans induce selective referrals will be readily apparent in 
any situation in which a physician has a choice of where to ad-
mit a particular patient. 
C. "Knowingly and Willfully" 
The fraud and abuse provisions further require that remuner-
ation be knowing and willful in order to constitute a crime. Thus 
the statute is aimed at those who intentionally violate the 
prohibitions of the Amendments. 76 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(l)-(2) (1985); see supra note 47. 
76. Knowingly and willfully is most commonly used in a criminal context and is vari-
ously defined. See United States v. McKim, 26 F. Cas. 1122, 1122 (W.D. Pa. 1869) (No. 
15,693) (The court held that under an act that required the violation be knowing and 
willful, intent to defraud is not necessary. "The penalty is incurred, the offense complete, 
when the defendants 'have left undone those things which they ought to have done' ('and 
done things which they ought not to have done'), and this without any fraudulent or 
criminal intent."); United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1868). In Kirby, the Court stated 
that knowingly and willfully applies 
to those who know that the acts performed will have that effect, and perform 
them with the intention that such shall be their operation. When the acts which 
create [the statutory violation] are in themselves unlawful, the intention [to vio-
late the statute] will be imputed ... although the attainment of other ends may 
have been his primary object. 
Id. at 485-86. In United States v. Fifty Waltham Watch Movements, 139 F. 291 
(N.D.N.Y. 1905), the court stated: 
'Knowingly' is frequently used ... in contradistinction to 'innocently,' 'igno-
rantly,' or 'unintentionally.' ... 
. . . Conceding that to constitute a criminal offense in violating a statute there 
must be 'a criminal intent,' or a 'bad mind,' it seems clear to this court that, 
where the statute offended against fails to specify a particular intent as the one 
which must exist in order to make the doing of the act criminal, the knowing 
and willful violation of the statute (if not justified) for some personal end or gain 
shows the bad mind and establishes the criminal intent. 
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Hospitals clearly can foresee, and may deliberately encourage, 
the potential inducement of referrals when setting up incentive 
plans. That incentive plans encourage physicians to admit pa-
tients selectively must be obvious to hospital administrators.77 
Clearly, administrators who desire this effect violate the statute. 
But even if not deliberate, when administrators, with knowledge 
that the incentive plan would induce referrals, implement it any-
way, they violate the statute. 
United States v. Greber78 facilitates a more definite showing 
of purpose. In Greber, the Third Circuit held that "if one pur-
pose of the payment was to induce future referrals, the medicare 
statute has been violated."79 Hospital-physician incentive plans 
induce physicians to refer profitable patients to the offering hos-
pital and to order services in a particular manner. The plans re-
ward physicians for admitting profitable patients. Commenta-
tors note that the PPS will encourage hospitals to attempt to 
admit only the less costly patients.80 An incentive plan should 
suggest the possibility of an attempt by the hospital in question 
to alter its case mix by encouraging its physicians to admit cer-
tain types of patients. Nevertheless, even if a purpose to induce 
referrals could not be proven, a purpose to induce physicians to 
order or arrange for particular services or goods is evident on the 
face of the plans. The basic philosophy behind such plans is that 
physicians will administer cost-effective care if paid to do so. 
Id. at 300 (citing United States v. Claypool, 14 F. 127 (W.D. Mo. 1882)); see also W. 
LAFAVE & A. ScOTI, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW§ 28, at 196 (1972) (footnotes omitted): 
[For] crimes which require that the defendant intentionally cause a specific re-
sult ... it is now generally accepted that a person who acts ... intends a result 
of his act ... under two quite different circumstances: (1) when he consciously 
desires that result ... ; and (2) when he knows that that result is practically 
certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result. 
But see Elfbrandt v. Russell, 97 Ariz. 140, 145-46, 397 P.2d 944, 947 (1964) ("evil mo-
tive" necessary or act committed voluntarily and purposefully), rev'd on other grounds, 
384 U.S. 11 (1966); State ex rel. Grover v. Grover, 158 Or. 635, 639-40, 77 P.2d 430, 432 
(1938) ("determination with a bad intent" needed) (citing Felton v. United States, 96 
U.S. 699, 702 (1877)). 
77. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. 
78. 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 396 (1985). For a discussion of 
Greber, see supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
79. Id. at 69 (emphasis added). 
80. Sorkin suggests that the PPS should serve as a disincentive for hospitals to in-
crease patient volume because no additional profits would result from the additional pa-
tients admitted. However, if the hospital could alter its case mix, that is, if it could get a 
disproportionate number of profitable patients, the hospital would beat the PPS and 
increased profits would result. A. SORKIN, supra note 14, at 45-47; Comment, Provider 
Liability Under Public Law 98-21: The Medicare Prospective Payment System in Light 
of Wickline v. State, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 1011, 1018-19 (1985). 
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The rewards are intended to influence the behavior of physicians 
in caring for patients. 81 
III. ABUSES AND THREATS TO QUALITY HEALTH CARE 
Hospital administrators' implementation of incentive plans is 
designed to ensure the economic well-being of the hospital.82 
Ideally, under such a plan, each patient would receive only the 
care necessary to treat his or her diagnosed condition. Increased 
efficiency in the health care industry would reduce waste in the 
Medicare program. In other words, the purpose of the incentive 
plans is increased efficiency within the system, an indisputably 
admirable goal in light of the escalating financial difficulties the 
Medicare system faces. 83 Thus, because the primary purpose of 
the DRG system is to decrease health care costs,8" one might 
argue that incentive plans further the will of Congress rather 
than frustrate it. 
Congress' primary concern when enacting the Fraud and 
Abuse Amendments, as evidenced in the legislative histories, 
was that money not necessary for patient care not be taken out 
of the Medicare and Medicaid systems.86 Incentive plans do not 
appear to frustrate this concern. On their face, incentive plans 
have no effect whatsoever on amounts of Medicare funds paid to 
hospitals. 86 Regardless of the implementation of incentive plans, 
hospitals receive only those funds authorized under a particular 
DRG. This fact, together with the efficiency arguments,87 sug-
81. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 34-
35. 
82. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text. 
83. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
84. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
85. See infra note 92. 
86. Note, supra note 31, at 766, suggests that without "deception" or "waste" in hos-
pital-physician incentive plans, no violation of the fraud and abuse provisions exists . 
.. This suggestion, however, is simply incorrect. As to "deception," the statute applies 
whether the action is overt or covert. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(l)-(2) (1982). And, as to 
"waste," increased cost to the Medicare program is not an essential element of a fraud 
and abuse violation. See United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173, 177 (7th Cir. 1980). 
In Legal Aspects of Health Care Reimbursement, the authors suggest that kickbacks 
may be permissible if the cost to Medicare is not increased, R. BUCHANAN & J. MINOR, 
supra note 17, at 133. The clear statutory language of the fraud and abuse statute, how-
ever, does not support their contention. Furthermore, although the actual payment to 
the physician does not increase the costs to the Medicare program, manipulation of the 
system by physicians, which the plans themselves encourage, will result in a substantial 
drain on Medicare. 
87. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. 
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gests the attractiveness of incentive plans as a means of fulfilling 
the PPS goal of cost containment. 
The potential for fraud and abuse in implementation of the 
incentive plans, however, outweighs the possible cost-effective-
ness of the plans. Regardless of whether the plans are, in theory, 
cost-effective, they promote fraudulent and abusive practices 
that defeat cost containment. Among the fraudulent or abusive 
practices these plans promote is "DRG creep," whereby doctors 
assign more "profitable" DRGs to "unprofitable" patients. In-
centive plans also encourage the deliberate early discharge and 
readmission of the same patient. Through this practice, the hos-
pital receives additional Medicare reimbursement as a result of 
two DRGs being assigned: one DRG on the initial admission and 
a second on the readmission. More tragically, incentive plans 
will produce an adverse impact on quality of care. 
A. Fraudulent and Abusive Practices 
In enacting the Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Congress 
sought to limit the use of Medicare funds to their intended pur-
pose-providing a safety net of necessary medical care for the 
elderly.BB The primary purpose of the amendments was "to 
strengthen the ability of the Federal and State governments to 
find and correct abuse and to detect and prosecute fraud."B9 
Fraud, according to the legislative history, is a purposeful at-
tempt to receive an unauthorized benefit through an intentional 
deception or misrepresentation.90 Program abuse is less clearly 
defined but includes activities "inconsistent with accepted sound 
medical or business practices resulting in excessive and unrea-
sonable financial cost to either medicare or medicaid."91 Con-
88. 1 Medicare and Medicaid Frauds Hearing, supra note 62, at 7 (statement of Sen. 
Church). 
89. H.R. REP. No. 393, supra note 62, at 48, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CoNG. & Ao. 
NEWS at 3050. 
90. Id. 
91. Id.; see also Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud Act: Hearing on H.R. 15536, H.R. 
13347, H.R. 14805, H.R. 6483, and H.R. 6623 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the 
Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 81-82 (1976) (statement of Beverlee A. Myers, Lecturer, Department of Medical 
Care Org., School of Pub. Health, University of Mich.) (quoting STAFF OF THE SuBCOMM. 
ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN 
COMMERCE. 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., A DISCURSIVE DICTIONARY OF HEALTH CARE 5 (Comm. 
Print 1976)): 
[A)buse is defined as "improper or excessive use of program benefits, resources 
or services by either providers or consumers. Abuse can occur intentionally or 
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gress designed the amendments to cover those persons who de-
fraud or abuse the Medicare and Medicaid programs for 
personal gain. 92 
The AMA's opposition to incentive plans93 poses a substantial 
challenge to any argument that the plans do not constitute 
abuse because they comport with "accepted sound medical . . . 
practices." The AMA believed that the plan it evaluated gave 
doctors an incentive to admit those patients more appropriately 
treated at a less costly facility or as outpatients.9 " 
The AMA espoused three reasons for opposing the particular 
incentive plan. First, the plan subverted the Medicare system by 
undercutting the premise that a random sample of patients will 
be admitted to each acute care hospital.911 If greater numbers of 
patients with "profitable" DRGs are admitted to hospitals with 
incentive plans, other area hospitals are likely to receive those 
patients with "unprofitable" DRGs. Thus, the other area hospi-
tals will not have the same "break even" potential as hospitals 
with incentive plans. Second, the AMA feared the plan would 
increase the number of patients transferred out of hospitals with 
incentive plans to other area hospitals.96 Third, such plans 
would undercut peer review organizations' (PROs)97 monitoring 
unintentionally, when services are used which are excessive or unnecessary; 
which are not the appropriate treatment for the patient's condition . . . . It 
should be distinguished from fraud, in which deliberate deceit is used by provid-
ers or consumers .... Abuse is not necessarily either intentional or illegal." 
92. "When Congress passed the Medicare/Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amend-
ments of 1977, it was our hope that we wouldn't have to keep hearing about millions of 
lost Federal dollars .... [l]t is evident that millions, and perhaps billions, of dollars are 
still being wasted in our medicare and medicaid programs." Medicare & Medicaid 
Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and Long-Term Care of the House 
Select Comm. on Aging, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980) (statement of Rep. Abdnor); 1 
Medicare and Medicaid Frauds Hearing, supra note 62, at 4 (statement of Sen. Percy). 
93. The AMA expressed its opposition to incentive plans in a letter to the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services regarding the Hollywood Community Hospital plan, 
see Richman, supra note 26, and in one of its Judicial Council Reports, Judicial Council, 
Report D, supra note 41. It stated that "the physician is not entitled to derive a profit 
which results from services provided by the hospital under DRG payments." Id. at 176, 
reprinted in 253 J. AM.A. at 2425. 
94. Richman, supra note 26, at 48. 
95. Id. at 48, 53. 
96. Id. This apparently assumes that the incentive plan penalizes in some manner for 
overutilization of services. The Hollywood Community Hospital plan, however, see supra 
note 33, does not, from their program statement, appear to do so. 
97. PROs are groups of local physicians, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-l(l)(A) (1982), who review 
medical decisionmaking to determine whether care is reasonable and necessary, whether 
services meet professional standards of quality, and that care cannot be provided more 
appropriately and economically on an outpatient basis or in a different type of health 
care facility. Id. § 1320c-3(a)(l)(A)-(C). If the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
determines (through information that PROs supply) that patients are being admitted 
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of physician practices because PROs rely on accurate records as 
a check on hospital practice. Under the incentive plan, doctors 
have an "incentive to rig the DRG system. "98 
Incentive plans are likely to magnify existing abuses such as 
"DRG creep." DRG creep refers to physicians' assigning a pa-
tient to a DRG with a higher reimbursement rate than that to 
which the patient should properly be assigned.99 Waving the car-
rot of profit sharing under the noses of unethical or marginally 
ethical physicians, who put personal financial gain before their 
patients' welfare, would encourage an increase in DRG creep 
and discourage systemwide cost containment because the larger 
the reimbursement for the hospital, the greater the possibility 
that the doctor will make money.100 
By encouraging DRG creep, the incentive plans frustrate legis-
lative purpose. Hospitals improperly obtain more Medicare 
funds than that which the HCF A deems proper for care of a par-
ticular illness. 101 This countervailing consideration outweighs the 
unnecessarily or are being discharged and readmitted unnecessarily, the Secretary may 
assess penalties, including denying payment and requiring the hospital to correct or pre-
vent the practice. Id. § 1395ww(O(2) (Supp. Ill 1985). 
98. Richman, supra note 26, at 53. Here, the AMA is apparently concerned that in-
centive plans will encourage the practice of "DRG creep." See infra text accompanying 
notes 99-101. 
99. See, e.g., J. Griffith, in DRG's-What's Next? Two Views, supra note 26, at 18; 
Stern & Epstein, Institutional Responses to Prospective Payment Based on Diagnosis 
Related Groups: Implications for Cost, Quality, and Access, 312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 621 
(1985); Schnitzer, Physicians and Prospective Payment, 6 WHITIIER L. REV. 863 (1984) 
(speech presented to the Third Annual Whittier Health Law Symposium, Mar. 24, 1984, 
discussing ways to beat the DRG system). Schnitzer raises the question with which this 
Note deals but does not address it specifically. Id. at 868. 
100. Lowenstein, lezzoni & Moskowitz, supra note 42, describes the incentives inher-
ent in the PPS itself that limit its cost-containment potential: 
Hospitals are encouraged to (1) admit larger numbers of patients, especially pa-
tients with easy-to-care-for illnesses and short anticipated lengths of stay; (2) 
split therapy for an illness into two parts, to spread a patient's care over two 
hospital admissions; (3) unbundle diagnostic procedures, shifting some to the 
ambulatory setting (outside the PPS); (4) upgrade principal and secondary diag-
nostic codes, to obtain a higher-paying DRG assignment ("DRG creep"); and (5) 
perform more complex surgical procedures to inflate the DRG ("procedure 
inflation"). 
Id. at 2633. The authors question the effects of proposed physician DRGs on existing 
incentives. Physician DRGs, like incentive plans, may further encourage physicians and 
hospitals to avoid cost containment by the above described means. See also Wennberg, 
McPherson & Caper, Will Payment Based on Diagnosis-Related Groups Control Hospi-
tal Costs?, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 295, 299 (1984). 
101. PROs, see supra note 97, may serve to discourage both inappropriate discharge 
and readmittances and DRG creep. Because a sufficient review of the necessity and effi-
ciency of length-of-stay and services performed may be accomplished "on a sample or 
other basis" of admissions, 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(k) (1982), however, PROs may not be very 
effective in curbing abuses. According to a recent study by the Office of Analysis and 
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efficiency argument in favor of incentive plans. Although hospi-
tals using incentive plans may increase revenues or simply main-
tain solvency, the Medicare system suffers as the hospital drains 
from the system additional funds not necessary to patient care. 
Incentive plans may also encourage some physicians to dis-
charge patients before it is medically appropriate and then to 
readmit them in order to provide further care. Through this 
practice, a patient who would ordinarily create a loss for the 
hospital because of an unusually long length-of-stay or an un-
usually complicated illness will provide income for the hospital 
under two DRGs: that assigned at the first admission, and that 
assigned at the second. 102 
B. An Intolerable Threat to Health Care 
Although the Medicare statute has been amended to en-
courage cost containment, Congress did not intend to make eco-
nomic efficiency the sole criterion by which to assess hospital 
policies and procedures. The adverse impact on quality of care 
that incentive plans promote greatly outweighs any benefit to 
the hospital and the Medicare system that such plans may pro-
vide.103 The quality of patient care remains a central concern, 10• 
Inspections of the Office of Inspector General, "It appears that many PROs have not 
effectively used the authorities or the processes available to address instances of poor 
quality care associated with premature discharges .... " Office of Analysis and Inspec-
tions, Office of Inspector Gen., Region V, Inspection of Inappropriate Discharges and 
Transfers, reprinted in Out "Sooner and Sicker": Myth or Medicare Crisis?: Hearing 
Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 12 (1986) [hereinafter 
Medicare Crisis Hearing). 
102. See Lowenstein, Iezzoni & Moskowitz, supra note 42; Schnitzer, supra note 99, 
at 864. But see Do DRGs Diminish the Quality of Care?, supra note 23, at 431 {asserting 
that DRGs are not the cause of premature discharge). 
103. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. 
104. A congressional focus on quality of care provided to Medicare patients was ap-
parent in recent legislative hearings on quality of care under DRGs. See, e.g., Joint 
Hearing on Quality Health Care, supra note 13. Concerns regarding quality of care were 
also raised in congressional hearings on prospective payment. See, e.g., 1 PPS Hearing, 
supra note 4, at 47 {statement of Sen. Durenberger); see also Matsui, supra note 13; cf. 
Do DRGs Diminish the Quality of Care?, supra note 23, at 432 {stating that although the 
federal government expresses concern with quality of care under the PPS, it has made 
no effort to study the actual impact). 
At least one court has shown concern with quality of care: "The payments to [the 
defendant) did not increase the cost to the government of patient care, decrease the 
quality of patient care purchased by the government or involve the misapplication of 
government funds." United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir. 1978). 
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especially in the assessment of prospective payment1011 and in-
centive plans.106 
DRGs alone may cause the discharge of patients before ade-
quate care is furnished. 107 Because most physicians have a finan-
cial stake in the continued existence of hospitals that have 
granted them staff privileges,1°8 physicians are motivated to con-
tain costs where feasible. Today, doctors treat most complicated 
procedures and serious illnesses in the hospital setting, often on 
an outpatient basis, rather than in the home or the physician's 
office.109 Thus, the modern physician has a definite interest in 
keeping solvent the hospital that has granted him staff privi-
leges. Physicians understand the potential financial effects of the 
DRGs upon their hospitals110 and will, if possible, reduce ser-
105. "(I]nstitutional responses to these incentives [of the DRG system] are likely to 
decrease costs per case and have a moderate chance of decreasing total health care costs, 
but are also likely to have deleterious effects on the quality of patient care and on access 
to care." Stern & Epstein, supra note 99, at 621; see also R. Rubin, in DRGs-What's 
Next? Two Views, supra note 26, at 8; Matsui, supra note 13. But see 1 PPS Hearing, 
supra note 4, at 30-31 (statement of Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and 
Human Servs.) (assuring that the PPS will allow continued commitment to high quality 
care and may enhance quality of care by encouraging hospital specialization). 
106. The Department of Health and Human Services Regional Inspector General's 
investigation into the Hollywood Community Hospital incentive plan is, in part, focusing 
on the impact of the plan on quality of care, see supra note 36; Judicial Council, Report 
D, supra note 41. "DRG legislation was intended to eliminate waste and stimulate effi-
ciency in hospital care without reducing the quality of health care. Arrangements by 
which physicians participate in reimbursements to hospitals, particularly where there are 
incentives that may adversely affect the quality of patient care, thwart the intent of the 
legislation." Id. at 176, reprinted in 253 J. A.MA 2425, 2425 (1985). 
107. The results of a survey of state nursing home ombudsmen support this conten-
tion. Seventy-five percent of those ombudsmen responding said that "patients are dis-
charged sicker or much sicker than before PPS." Joint Hearing on Quality Health Care, 
supra note 13, at 3-4 (survey submitted by Rep. Synar). Medicare Crisis Hearing, supra 
note 101, addresses the problem of premature discharge. See also 1 Quality of Care 
Under Medicare's Prospective Payment System: Hearings Before the Senate Special 
Comm. on Aging, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
108. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
109. 
Of the some 142,000 active practitioners in the United States in 1929, about 
eight out of ten were affiliated with a hospital, and about one in twenty-five even 
had private offices or held hours for private patients in hospitals. By 1975 virtu-
ally no physician would consider practicing without the resources and consul-
tants that hospital affiliation brought, and about one in four of the some 330,000 
active American physicians practiced full-time in a hospital. 
s. REISER, MEDICINE AND THE REIGN OF TECHNOLOGY 156 (1978) (footnote omitted). 
110. See, e.g., Angell, Cost Containment and the Physician, 254 J. A.M.A. 1203 
(1985); Ellwood, supra note 8; Jessee & Suver, supra note 26; Johnson, Life, Death, and 
the Dollar Sign: Medical Ethics and Cost Containment, 252 J. A.M.A. 223 (1984); 
Mushlin, supra note 24; Stern & Epstein, supra note 99; Stone, Law's Influence on 
Medicine and Medical Ethics, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 309 (1985); Wennberg, McPherson 
& Caper, supra note 100; R. Rubin, in DRG's-What's Next? Two Views, supra note 26. 
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vices and treatment wherever possible, presumably without tak-
ing risks with patient health. Whether or not incentive plans are 
utilized, physicians will have the motive to cut back or contain 
costs in the manner they feel best. 111 
Incentive plans heighten physicians' motivation, induced by 
DRGs and prospective payment, to eliminate costs.112 Thus, the 
plans magnify the threat to quality of care. Medical schools and 
residencies train physicians to be complete in caring for their 
patients. m An incentive plan, however, encourages physicians to 
disregard that training by rewarding most lucratively those phy-
sicians who provide patients the least amount of carem in the 
shortest period of time. 116 
Physicians themselves have reported concerns about the qual-
ity of care in relation to the DRG program. An informal, ongoing 
111. The potential threat of medical malpractice suits may discourage more severe 
cases of withholding or curtailment of care. "There is no question that the malpractice 
courts are enforcing a standard of care that, because it is drawn from existing practice, 
embodies many of the system's distortions and its lack of cost consciousness. One of the 
law's effects is to make any economizing move suspect .... " Havighurst, Competition 
in Health Services: Overview, Issues and Answers, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1145 {1981). 
But "[p]otential tort liability is only an uncertain inducement to good quality perform-
ance because the likelihood is small that legal exposure will materialize from a 
caregiver's skimping on quality to save money." Kapp, Legal and Ethical Implications 
of Health Care Reimbursement by Diagnosis Related Groups, 12 LAW MED. & HEALTH 
CARE 245, 249 {1984). 
For a discussion of the medical malpractice problems for physicians that arise because 
of financially motivated behavior under DRGs and incentive plans, see Chenen, supra 
note 31, at 134; Kapp, supra; Note, Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law in Light of 
Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1004 {1985); Comment, supra note 80; see also 
Jessee & Suver, supra note 26, at 6; Note, Medicare's Prospective Payment System: Can 
Quality Care Survive?, 69 lowA L. REV. 1417, 1431-44 {1984) {arguing that medical mal-
practice law is inadequate to protect victims of cost containment). But see Mushlin, 
supra note 24, at 18: 
Any alteration in practice patterns has the potential for either increasing or de-
creasing the quality of patient care. Curtailing unnecessary utilization should 
decrease morbidity and mortality through elimination of the risks of unneeded 
diagnostic or therapeutic efforts as well as via the reduction of errors in diagno-
sis resulting from unnecessary tests or procedures. If needed services are cur-
tailed, however, the quality of care will be affected adversely. 
Physicians making financially motivated patient care decisions may also be vulnerable 
to conflict of interest claims. Chenen, supra note 31, at 141; Comment, supra note 80, at 
1032. 
112. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text. 
113. Lowenstein, Iezzoni & Moskowitz, supra note 42, at 2636 {citing Hardison, To 
Be Complete, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 193 {1979)). 
114. More intensive care during a short length-of-stay will not necessarily ensure the 
physician a reward under an incentive plan. Because each test performed costs the hospi-
tal money, the more tests performed, the less available for distribution to physicians. 
115. Although the PPS encourages this behavior by the hospital, incentive plans ex-
tend the motivation to the physician. Comment, supra note 80, at 1023-26 {discussing 
the malpractice issues that result from undertreatment). 
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AMA survey116 reports that sixty-six percent of the physicians 
responding feel that quality of care has deteriorated since the 
implementation of DRGs.117 Hospitals discourage physicians 
from immediately treating secondary conditions or complica-
tions because of the limitations on reimbursement.118 In addi-
tion, physicians are concerned with the possible effects of early 
discharges on the health of their patients.119 Finally, physicians 
feel "pressure" from hospital administrators to limit laboratory 
tests and procedures that may be necessary to proper diagno-
ses. 120 Because incentive plans increase the economic pressures 
that members of the medical profession already feel, the plans 
magnify the existing threat to the delivery of quality care.121 
Incentive plans encourage physicians to put their financial in-
terests and those of the hospital ahead of their ethical obliga-
tions to patients.122 Because incentive plans encourage physi-
116. The "Monitoring Project" was not designed as a "scientific" survey and is being 
used as an "information assessment activity to ascertain the current impact of the PPS 
and to identify possible 'problem' areas that might need further study." Report of the 
Am. Med. Ass'n Bd. of Trustees, AMA's DRG Monitoring Project and the Prospective 
Pricing System 6 (Dec. 1984) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.); Report of the Arn. 
Med. Ass'n Bd. of Trustees, AMA's DRG Monitoring Project and the Prospective Pric-
ing System 5 (Dec. 1985) [hereinafter 1985 AMA Report) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. 
REF.). 
117. 1985 AMA Report, supra note 116, at 6. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 6-7. 
121. The General Accounting Office recently studied incentive plans and concluded 
that some plans encourage physicians to undertreat patients. See S. REP. No. 520, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1986). The Senate Committee on Finance proposed an amendment to 
a recent House bill, H.R. 1868, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), to address this problem. This 
amendment would allow the Secretary of Health and Human Services to assess civil 
money penalties against a physician who underserves or fails to admit a Medicare pa-
tient due to projected length-of-stay or projected treatment costs. The penalty will only 
be imposed if the patient's health is adversely affected and the physician participates in 
an incentive plan that determines rewards by considering length-of-stay or treatment 
costs. The amendment would also provide for fines against hospitals offering such incen-
tive plans if either the patient or the physician could be individually identified. Id. 
HMOs and similar cost-effective medical care organizations would be initially exempted 
from the amendment's coverage. Id. at 26-27. 
The Senate Report, however, does not conclude that incentive plans violate the fraud 
and abuse provisions of the Medicare statute and so would not prohibit the use of all 
such plans. This Note would go further, finding that incentive plans do violate the fraud 
and abuse provisions and forbidding their use by hospitals. See supra Part II. 
122. In one scholar's view, medical ethics are based on two ma.'lims: "'do what you 
think will benefit the patient' and 'primum non nocere,' or first of all, do no harm." 
Stone, supra note 110, at 311. An interesting discussion of the ethical problems faced by 
physicians who engage in health care rationing can be found in Pellegrino, Rationing 
Health Care: The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping, 2 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 23 
(1986). See also Johnson, supra note 110 (discussing the ethical problems facing special-
ists in critical care). 
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cians to discharge patients as early as possible and minimize the 
use of ancillary services, 123 the plans may reward physicians for 
neglecting the obligation to provide the best possible treat-
ment124 by taking full advantage of all hospital resources. The 
sooner the physician discharges a patient, and the less care pro-
vided during the patient's stay, iu the greater the potential profit 
in reimbursement for that patient's care. The greater the profit 
per patient, the greater the doctor's reward from an imple-
mented incentive plan. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has argued that as a matter of both policy and stat-
utory interpretation, incentive plans are not acceptable. The 
plans clearly violate the fraud and abuse provisions of the Medi-
care statute and thus constitute an improper means of maintain-
ing hospital financial stability under the PPS. Congress explic-
itly stated in the Fraud and Abuse Amendments that any 
remuneration in return for referrals is prohibited. Those hospi-
tals using incentive plans must reconsider their programs in 
light of potential prosecution and even felony convictions. Fur-
thermore, the potential for decreased quality of care and in-
creased DRG creep greatly diminishes the attractiveness of the 
incentive plans as a means of cost containment. By utilizing in-
centive plans, hospitals exacerbate the existing problems of 
fraud and abuse in the Medicare system. 
Furthermore, courts, when confronting incentive plans in 
prosecutions under the Fraud and Abuse Amendments, should 
123. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text. 
124. 
It is one thing to entrust your life and health at times of crisis to a physician 
who is committed to the practical ethics that involve[] a quest for excellence and 
who may err on the side of doing too much. It is quite another to entrust your 
life and health at times of crisis to a physician whose diagnostic and therapeutic 
interventions are limiled by new regulatory constraints or incentives of competi-
tive efficiency that "place the provider at economic risk." 
Stone, supra note 110, at 312; see A. SORKIN, supra note 14, at 89 (suggesting that incen-
tives such as hospital office lease agreements, under which the number of patients the 
physician admits to the hospital determines the lease payments, may affect the indepen-
dence of physicians' health care decisions). 
125. "[P]hysicians remain the first line of defense against erosion in the quality of 
care. Although prospective payment will give hospitals an incentive to cut the number of 
tests or to reduce the length of stay, everyone is counting on physicians to assure that 
the patient is not endangered." R. Rubin, in DRG's-What's Next? Two Views, supra 
note 26, at 8; see also Jessee & Suver, supra note 26, at 4. 
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take the statutory language literally-finding those participating 
in such plans guilty of felonies-in order to ensure that health 
care providers honor the intent of Congress and that the elderly 
receive competent care. The elderly deserve comprehensive, 
high-quality care whenever medical care is indicated, not only 
when it is economical for hospitals and physicians to provide it. 
The courts must provide this assurance to the elderly by strictly 
interpreting the fraud and abuse statute and forbidding the use 
of incentive plans. The legislature forbade incentive plans 
through the fraud and abuse provisions of the Medicare Act. 
Now judicial and enforcement personnel must carry out that leg-
islative directive. 
Incentive, or profit-sharing, plans invite physicians to balance 
the quality of care against personal financial reward. That self-
interest might outweigh excellence in care and influence medical 
judgment is surely an intolerable threat to the Medicare system. 
-Kathryn A. Krecke 
EDITOR'S POSTSCRIPT 
Recent Congressional action supports the Notewriter's argu-
ments against physician incentive plans. The Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1986 specifically outlaws payments "di-
rectly or indirectly, to a physician as an inducement to reduce or 
limit services" for Medicare patients.126 
The Hollywood Community Hospital127 has ended its physi-
cian incentive program in response to the new law.128 The De-
partment of Health and Human Services Regional Inspector 
General, who had been scrutinizing the hospital as a result of its 
implementation of the incentive program, has terminated his 
investigation. 129 
126. Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9313, 100 Stat. 2002, 2003 (1986). 
127. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. 
128. Telephone interview with Donald Goldman, attorney for Hollywood Community 
Hospital (July 20, 1987). 
129. Id. 
